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NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN 
RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE 
PERMANENT LAW 
REPORTS. UNTIL RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT 
TO REVISION OR WITHDRAWAL. 
Pamela H. JEFFCOAT 
v. 
James W. JEFFCOAT. 
No. 6, Sept. Term, 1994. 
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland. 
Nov. 30, 1994. 
Michael Hart Davis (Shirley A. Lindsey and 
Bregel, Kerr, Davis & Dantes, on the brief), 
Towson, for appellant. 
Julie Ellen Landau, Baltimore, for appellee. 
Argued before ALPERT, FISCHER and 
MURPHY, JJ. 
FISCHER, Judge. 
*1 Pamela H. Jeff coat appeals from a judgment of 
the Circuit Court for Baltimore County arising out 
of divorce proceedings brought by her against James 
W. Jeff coat, appellee. 
In this appeal, appellant raises the following 
issues: 
I. Did the court err by not including some of the 
value of marital property dissipated by appellee 
after separation and before trial in the value of 
marital property from which it could make a 
monetary award when appellee, immediately upon 
separation, removed virtually all of the parties' 
jointly titled liquid assets from their joint names 
to an account in his name alone and then over the 
next 13 months spent substantially all those funds? 
II. Did the court err in finding that a portion of 
life insurance proceeds paid more than two years 
prior to trial were non-marital when: 1) there was 
no proof of a gift of the policy, 2) there was no 
allegation that the policy had any value at the time 
of the transfer, 3) the policy was maintained only 
by marital funds, 4) there was no tracing of the 
policy proceeds to any existing asset, 5) the 
proceeds of the policy were commingled with 
marital property when received two years before 
trial, and 6) the commingled proceeds were 
further commingled with other marital assets by 
appellee? 
III. Is it contrary to the Family Law Statute to 
order the parties to pay work related day care 
expenses on the basis of their pro rata incomes 
after adjustment of their incomes for child 
support, and did the court err in not making a 
finding regarding the parties' incomes when the 
amount of income was disputed? 
IV. Did the trial court err by not properly 
calculating the monetary award using the three 
step process of (1) identifying marital property, 
(2) valuing marital property, and (3) granting a 
monetary award? 
Facts 
The parties married in 1977, and two children 
were born of the marriage, James Richard, born in 
1983, and Evan Cleave, born in 1989. Appellant 
insists the union was problematic from its outset. 
Appellee contends there were few stresses in the 
marriage until 1991, when appellee began law 
school. In 1991, appellee left the family home, 
apparently at appellant's suggestion. At a meeting 
on or about April 27, 1992, appellant informed 
appellee that she desired a divorce. Appellee 
responded by returning to live in the family home. 
Appellant's attorney threatened court action if 
appellee did not leave the family home and appellee 
complied. 
During the course of the marriage, the parties 
were able to accumulate substantial assets. 
According to appellant, their net worth totalled 
$763,000 at the time of separation. Upon leaving, 
appellee withdrew joint funds totaling approximately 
$218,000 and placed them in his name alone. He 
also borrowed the maximum amount possible on 
their home equity line of credit, approximately 
$82,000. Appellee placed these funds in a bank 
account in his name. In addition to his control of 
the parties' joint funds, appellant avers that appellee 
had income from earnings and other sources totaling 
$88,000. Appellant alleges appellee spent almost 
$300,000 during the one year period of the parties' 
separation. According to appellant, appellee had 
spent all but approximately $68,000 of the joint 
funds by the trial date. 
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*2 On October 23, 1979, appellee's father 
transferred the ownership of Metropolitan Life 
Insurance Policy # 716102822 PR on the father's 
life to appellee. When transferred, the policy was 
subject to a loan of $6,494. Appellee received 
$41,617.69 from Metropolitan Life upon his 
father's death in 1991. The proceeds from the 
insurance policy were placed in a joint checking 
account and, after the separation, in an account in 
appellee's name. 
The trial court ruled that appellant could only 
receive one half of $17,000 in premiums paid on the 
policy during the course of the marriage. The 
remainder of the insurance policy was deemed by 
the trial court to be non-marital property of 
appellee. A monetary award of $29,473 was 
granted to appellant. Appellee was permitted to 
retain the proceeds of the insurance policy on 
appellee's deceased father as non-marital funds. 
I. 
[1] Appellant's contention that the court erred in 
failing to find that appellee dissipated marital funds 
rests primarily on an allegation that the trial judge 
used an incorrect standard in evaluating appellee's 
actions in spending marital monies. Appellant 
contends that the trial judge required that appellant 
prove fraud in order to show dissipation of assets 
had taken place. In Sharp v. Sharp, 58 Md.App. 
386, 399, 473 A.2d 499 (1984), writing for this 
Court, Judge Alpert stated: 
[W]here a chancellor finds that property was 
intentionally dissipated in order to avoid inclusion 
of that property towards consideration of a 
monetary award, such intentional dissipation is no 
more than a fraud on marital rights, see Levin v. 
Levin, 166 Md. 451, 453[, 171 A. 77] (1934). 
This correct statement of the law was expressed 
slightly differently in Ross v. Ross, 90 Md.App. 
176, 190, 600 A.2d 891, vacated on other grounds, 
327 Md. 101, 607 A.2d 933 (1992), wherein we 
observed: 
When a court finds that property was dissipated to 
the point of being a fraud on marital rights, it 
should consider the dissipated property as extant 
to be valued with other existing marital property. 
The quoted language in Ross apparently led the 
trial court in this case to say "I can't find in this 
case, based on the evidence I have heard, that there 
was a use of marital funds such as would constitute a 
fraud on the marital rights of the parties, and, 
therefore, I grant the motion on the issue of 
dissipation of assets." 
[2] It appears the court believed it had to find 
fraud before it could find dissipation of marital 
funds. Fraud can only be found by clear and 
convincing evidence. Aeropesca Ltd. v. Butler 
Aviation International, Inc., 44 Md.App. 610, 623, 
411 A.2d 1055 (1980). The same quantum of 
proof, clear and convincing evidence, is necessary to 
establish constructive fraud. Dixon v. Process 
Corp., 38 Md.App. 644, 657, 382 A.2d 893 
(1978). The trial court's finding is understandable 
in view of the holding in Ross, supra, relied upon 
by the trial court. Upon reflection, however, we see 
no adequate reason to require a higher degree of 
proof to establish dissipation than any other aspect 
of marital property. Under a proper standard, the 
trial court should be able to find dissipation by a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
*3 The case at bar is a perfect illustration of the 
injustice that may result by imposing an 
unreasonable burden of proof on a party who 
accuses the other of dissipation of assets. The 
parties in this case over a period of less than fifteen 
years accumulated substantial assets; although both 
were employed, neither had a large income. In spite 
of the expense of raising two children, and even 
sending them to private schools, they had acquired a 
net worth of over $760,000. It is clear that they 
were able to accomplish this by hard work, 
frugality, and sound fiscal management. 
Notwithstanding this past record of sound fiscal 
management, in one year following the separation of 
the parties, appellee spent almost $300,000 of the 
parties' money. This should be sufficient to 
establish a prima facie case of dissipation. 
Many state courts have considered dissipation of 
marital assets in determining the division of marital 
property. In Sharp v. Sharp, 58 Md.App. 386, 473 
A.2d 499 (1984), this Court held that 
where a chancellor finds that property was 
intentionally dissipated in order to avoid inclusion 
of that property towards a consideration of a 
monetary award, such intentional dissipation is no 
more than a fraud on marital rights, see Levin v. 
Levin, 166 Md. 451, 453, 171 A. 77 (1934), and 
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the chancellor should consider the dissipated 
property as extant marital property ... to be valued 
with other existing marital property. 
Sharp, 58 Md.App. at 399, 473 A.2d 499. In its 
discussion of dissipation, the Court examined other 
jurisdictions that have addressed intentional 
dissipation of marital assets for the purpose of 
avoiding equitable distribution. Foremost is 
Illinois, which has statutory law expressly providing 
that a chancellor in dividing marital property should 
consider dissipation of assets. 111.Ann.Stat. ch. 40, 
§ 503(c)(1) (Smith-Hurd 1980 Vol., 1983-84 
Cum.Supp.). This Court, in Sharp, 58 Md.App. at 
401, 473 A.2d 499, cited Klingberg v. Klingberg, 
68 Ill.App.3d 513, 25 Ill.Dec. 246, 250, 386 
N.E.2d 517, 521 (1979), for the proposition that 
"[dissipation may be found where one spouse uses 
marital property for his or her own benefit for a 
purpose unrelated to the marriage at a time where 
the marriage is undergoing an irreconcilable 
breakdown." 
A number of states have statutes that specifically 
list dissipation of assets or fraudulent conveyances 
as a factor for the court to consider. Lawrence J. 
Golden, Equitable Distribution of Property, § 8.15 
(1983, 1993 Cum.Supp.) (listing Arizona, Illinois, 
Indiana, Montana, and West Virginia). 
Some states that have addressed dissipation of 
marital assets have followed Illinois law. Courts 
generally seem to adopt the Illinois Court's 
definition of dissipation. See e.g., Monte v. Monte, 
212 NJ.Super. 557, 515 A.2d 1233 
(Ct.App.Div.1986); Clements v. Clements, 10 
Va.App. 580, 397 S.E.2d 257 (1990). 
In Melrod v. Melrod, 83 Md.App. 180, 574 A.2d 
1, cert, denied, 321 Md. 67, 580 A.2d 1077 
(1990), this Court held that there was no evidence 
suggesting that the husband had dissipated proceeds 
from a sale of a partnership in order to deprive the 
wife of her marital rights. Melrod, 83 Md.App. at 
194, 574 A.2d 1. This suggests that, to prove 
dissipation, the party claiming dissipation must 
present affirmative evidence. In Rock v. Rock, 86 
Md.App. 598, 587 A.2d 1133 (1991), this Court 
placed the burden on the dissipating spouse. Rock, 
86 Md.App. at 619-620, 587 A.2d 1133. Recently, 
in Ross v. Ross, 90 Md.App. 176, 190, 600 A.2d 
891 (1992), this Court cited Sharp and held that 
"[t]he spouse alleging dissipation has the burden of 
proving dissipation and the value of such property." 
*4 Other courts disagree as to who bears the 
burden of proving the purpose of a conveyance. In 
some states, once the injured spouse makes a prima 
facie case that marital funds were spent once the 
marriage was breaking up, the burden shifts to the 
dissipating spouse to prove that the funds were spent 
for a proper purpose. Golden, at 375-376 (1993 
Supp.). In In re Marriage of Partyka, 158 
Ill.App.3d 545, 110 Ill.Dec. 499, 511 N.E.2d 676 
(1987), the court held: 
Once it is established that one party has liquidated 
marital assets, the party charged with dissipation 
msut establish by clear and specific evidence how 
the funds were spent; general and vague 
statements that they were spent on marital 
expenses or bills are inadequate to avoid a finding 
of dissipation. 
Partyka, 110 Ill.Dec. at 503, 511 N.E.2d at 680 
(citing In re Marriage of Smith, 128 Ill.App.3d 
1017, 84 Ill.Dec. 242, 471 N.E.2d 1008 (1984)). 
In In re Marriage of Smith, 128 Ill.App.3d 1017, 84 
Ill.Dec. 242, 471 N.E.2d 1008 (1984), the Illinois 
court examined many of its own opinions as well as 
the decisions of other jurisdictions, including 
Barriger v. Barriger, 514 S.W.2d 114 (Ky.1974), 
Cooksey v. Cooksey, 280 S.C. 347, 312 S.E.2d 581 
(1984), and E.E.C. v. E.J.C., 457 A.2d 688 
(Del. 1983), in order to determine that the burden of 
proof is on the party charged with the dissipation. 
More recently, the court noted: 
Once a prima facie case of dissipation is made, the 
party charged with dissipation must establish by 
clear and convincing evidence how the funds were 
spent; general and vague statements are not 
enough. 
In re Marriage of Murphy, 259 111.App.3d 336, 197 
Ill.Dec. 671, 673, 631 N.E.2d 893, 895 (1994). 
Illinois appears to be the only state requiring the 
dissipating spouse to prove by clear and convincing 
evidence that the funds were used for a marital 
purpose. See Golden, at 384 (1993 Supp.). 
Whereas in Illinois the dissipating spouse must 
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the 
property was not dissipated, other states require 
proof only by a preponderance of the evidence. In 
Manaker v. Manaker, 11 Conn.App. 653, 528 
A.2d 1170 (1987), the Connecticut court held that 
the "party which has control over marital assets and 
is charged with their dissipation has the burden of 
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accounting for those assets." The court continued, 
"This burden is met by a preponderance of the 
evidence." Manaker, 528 A.2d at 1173. The 
Connecticut court referred to In re Marriage of 
Smith, 128 Dl.App.3d 1017, 84 Ill.Dec. 242, 471 
N.E.2d 1008 (1984), and opined that the Illinois 
court's use of the language of "clear and specific 
evidence" referred to "the probative value of 
evidence and not the quantum of the evidence which 
was necessary to sustain the burden of proof." 
Manaker, 528 A.2d at 1173. 
The Court of Appeals of Virginia, in Clements v. 
Clements, 10 Va.App. 580, 397 S.E.2d 257 (1990), 
relied on Illinois law to define dissipation. Citing In 
re Marriage of Smith, 128 Ill.App.3d 1017, 84 
Ill.Dec. 242, 471 N.E.2d 1008 (1984) and Manaker 
v. Manaker, 11 Conn.App. 653, 528 A.2d 1170 
(1987), the court stated that once the aggrieved 
spouse shows marital funds were either withdrawn 
or used after the breakdown, the burden rests with 
the party charged with the dissipation to prove the 
money was spent for a proper purpose. Clements, 
397 S.E.2d at 261. The court then held that the 
burden is on the dissipating spouse to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the funds were 
used for some proper purpose. Clements, 397 
S.E.2dat261. 
*5 Although some courts refer to dissipation of 
marital assets as a fraudulent conveyance, they do 
not seem to require that the injured spouse prove 
dissipation by an elevated standard. See Monte v. 
Monte, 212 NJ.Super. 557, 515 A.2d 1233 (1986) 
(citing Sharp and holding that intentional dissipation 
is no more than a fraud on marital rights); Daniels 
v. Daniels, 557 S.W.2d 702, 705 (Mo.App.1977) 
("This court should look through his transparent 
maneuver just as courts have always disregarded 
fraudulent conveyances employed to hinder and 
delay creditors."); Barriger v. Barriger, 514 
S.W.2d 114 (Ky. 1974). 
A survey of case law does not support the 
argument that the injured spouse must prove the 
dissipation of assets by clear and convincing 
evidence. To analogize dissipation of assets to be a 
fraud on marital rights does not require a standard 
any higher than is used for any other aspect of 
marital property. In Sharp, the Court cited Colburn 
v. Colburn, 15 Md.App. 503, 292 A.2d 121 (1972). 
In Colburn, the Court held that the purpose of the 
husband's acts was to impoverish himself 
voluntarily "so as to fraudulently deprive his wife of 
her claim for alimony." Colburn, 15 Md.App. at 
515-516, 292 A.2d 121. The Sharp Court then 
stated that, even though Colburn dealt with alimony, 
there was no reason why the same principles 
involving fraud and intentional dissipation could not 
be applied to the determination of a monetary 
award. Sharp, 58 Md.App. at 400, 473 A.2d 499. 
[3] The burden of persuasion and the initial 
burden of production in showing dissipation is on 
the party making the allegation. Choate v. Choate, 
97 Md.App. 347, 366, 629 A.2d 1304 (1993). That 
party retains throughout the burden of persuading 
the court that funds have been dissipated, but after 
that party establishes a prima facie case that monies 
have been dissipated, i.e. expended for the principal 
purpose of reducing the funds available for equitable 
distribution, the burden shifts to the party who spent 
the money to produce evidence sufficient to show 
that the expenditures were appropriate. 
[4] It appears that appellant has established a 
prima facie showing of dissipation. The burden is 
now upon appellee to produce evidence of the bona 
fides of his expenditures. Appellee's expenditures 
should be evaluated by the court to determine 
whether dissipation has taken place. The court must 
determine whether joint funds have been spent for 
other than family purposes with the intention of 
reducing the amount of money available to the court 
for equitable distribution. If the court finds that 
monies have been dissipated, the party responsible 
should bear the loss. 
II. 
[5] In 1979, Cyril Jeffcoat, appellee's father, 
assigned ownership of a life insurance policy on 
Cyril's life to appellee. Appellant contends that the 
proceeds of the policy are marital property because 
the transfer instruments indicate the policy was 
transferred "for value received." Appellee testified 
the policy was a gift from his father, and the trial 
court so found. We do not believe that the trial 
judge was clearly erroneous in reaching the 
conclusion that the policy was a gift and, therefore, 
non-marital property. When received, the policy 
was subject to a loan. This loan was repaid with 
marital funds, and the policy premiums were paid 
with marital funds. The court credited appellant 
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with one-half of the approximately $17,000 in 
premiums paid and deemed that the remainder of the 
$41,617 received was the non-marital property of 
appellee. Upon receipt of the policy proceeds after 
Cyril's death, appellee placed the proceeds in a T. 
Rowe Price account along with other marital funds. 
*6 [6] During the course of the separation, 
appellee took control of all of the liquid assets of the 
parties, approximately $200,000. He put those 
assets in T. Rowe Price accounts. It appears from 
the evidence that the proceeds of the insurance 
policy were commingled with marital funds of the 
parties. The trial court credited appellant with one-
half of the premiums paid from marital funds, and 
permitted appellee to trace the remaining $41,617 in 
the T. Rowe Price account as non-marital funds of 
appellee. It appears to us that, in doing so, the 
court erred. 
At the time the Rule S74 schedule was filed, there 
was $67,927 in T. Rowe Price account # 
610099506-4. The court found that $41,617 of 
those funds were Cyril's life insurance proceeds. 
The fallacy in this approach is the assumption that 
appellee, after commingling the $41,617 along with 
substantial marital funds in a single account, spent 
only the marital funds. This is not possible. Since 
the marital and non-marital funds were commingled, 
it is impossible to trace $41,617 as non-marital 
funds. In May, 1992, the account into which 
appellee deposited the proceeds of insurance 
contained $262,113. At the time of trial, the 
account contained $67,927. In Melrod v. Melrod, 
83 Md.App. 180, 187, 574 A.2d 1 (1990), Judge 
Bloom, writing for this Court, stated: 
Property acquired by purchase during the marriage 
and not excluded by valid agreement between the 
parties, is marital property unless it can be traced 
directly to a nonmarital source of funds or 
property. FL § 8-201(e)(2)(iv) is quite specific; 
it excludes from marital property any property 
acquired during the marriage that is directly 
traceable to a non marital source. 'Directly 
traceable' is not synonymous with 'attributable.' 
Since Mr. Melrod commingled his income from 
non-marital sources with his marital income, no 
specific sum of money used to acquire property or 
reduce an indebtedness on any property can be 
directly traced to any source. This inability to 
trace property acquired during the marriage 
directly to a non-marital source simply means that 
all property so acquired was marital property. 
(Citation omitted. Emphasis in original.) 
Because the insurance proceeds were commingled 
with marital funds in an account that at one time 
totalled $262,113, and the commingled funds were 
spent down to $67,927 at the time of trial, it is 
impossible to trace any of the remaining funds as 
non-marital. 
III. 
[7] The trial judge ordered appellee to pay child 
support of $300 per month for each child, a total of 
$600. Appellant does not take issue with the $600 
in child support ordered by the court. In a separate 
provision, the judge ordered the parties to divide, in 
proportion to their respective incomes, day care 
expenses and summer camp expenses. He defined 
income to include appellant's receipt of alimony and 
child support. Appellant objects because the trial 
court permitted appellee to deduct child support 
from his income and add the amount to appellant's 
income in determining each of their adjusted 
incomes. Appellant agrees that preexisting child 
support may be deducted, but contends that is not 
applicable in this case. 
*7 It appears that appellant is correct. The trial 
judge's method improperly determines the parties' 
income. Appellee's income is diminished while 
appellant's income is increased. This method of 
analysis alters to appellant's disadvantage the 
proportion that each must pay. In addition, this is 
contrary to Md.Code (1984, 1991 Repl.Vol., 1994 
Cum.Supp.), § 12-204(a)(2)(ii) of the Family Law 
Article, which permits alimony payments, not child 
support, to be deducted from and credited to 
income. 
In addition, appellant complains that the trial 
court improperly calculated appellee's income by 
failing to consider his bonus and the value of certain 
benefits. It is not clear to us whether the trial judge 
considered those aspects. 
On remand, the trial judge should recompute the 
child support based upon the actual incomes of the 
parties, as found by the trial judge, and include in 
the amount of child support awarded an appropriate 
amount for day care and related expenses. 
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IV. 
[8] Appellant avers that the trial court erred in 
fixing the monetary award in a number of areas. 
Appellant notes that the judge failed to utilize the 
three-step process in determining a monetary award 
as set forth in Md. Code (1984, 1991 Repl.Vol.), § 
8-205 of the Family Law Article. As explained in 
Schweizer v. Schweizer, 301 Md. 626, 629-630, 
484 A.2d 267 (1984), the three-step process 
requires: 
(1) [T]he court shall determine which property is 
marital property.... § 8-203(a). 
(2) The court shall determine the value of all 
marital property. § 8-204. 
(3) [Upon compliance with (1) and (2) ], the court 
may grant a monetary award as an adjustment of 
the equities and rights of the parties concerning 
marital property, whether or not alimony is 
awarded. The court shall determine the amount 
and the method of payment of a monetary 
award.... § 8-205(a). 
Appellant contends that the trial judge, in making 
the monetary award, granted appellant an equal 
division in certain assets but, without explanation, 
overlooked other assets. For example, the judge 
disposed of $41,617 in insurance proceeds 
(previously discussed in section II) but ignored the 
$26,310 remaining in the account, effectively 
leaving it with appellee. Appellant also refers to a 
promissory note in appellee's name that the court 
failed to address. Appellant also contends that the 
disputed value of a Provident Savings Bank account 
# 2091364 was overlooked. Appellant claims the 
court did not address the dispute over furnishings 
located at 12 Jones Valley Circle, appellee's 
residence, valued at $5,000 by appellee and $10,000 
by appellant. In addition, appellee referred in his 
testimony to "cash on hand" and cash in Maryland 
National Bank totalling $14,730, which the court 
failed to consider. 
Appellee, on the other hand, insists that the 
equitable division does not need to be equal. 
Appellee maintains the trial judge followed the 
required steps. 
It appears from our review of the record that the 
trial judge may have inadvertently overlooked 
certain assets. His failure to refer in any way to the 
items appellant claims were overlooked lends 
credence to appellant's assertion that these items, 
and perhaps others, were overlooked. Since this 
case is being remanded for the trial judge to 
reconsider the dissipation aspect, it is appropriate 
for the trial court to reaccomplish the making of an 
appropriate monetary award taking into account all 
of the parties' marital property. 
V. 
*8 [9] Appellee has raised two issues in his brief 
for us to consider. Appellee asserts that the trial 
judge abused his discretion in awarding 
rehabilitative alimony to appellant. Appellee 
complains that the trial judge awarded appellant 
$1,000 per month in rehabilitative alimony in the 
absence of a showing that she has a need or intention 
to rehabilitate herself. 
Appellee cites Holston v. Holston, 58 Md.App. 
308, 473 A.2d 459, cert, denied, 300 Md. 484, 
479 A.2d 372 (1984) and Hull v. Hull, 83 Md.App. 
218, 574 A.2d 20, cert, denied, 321 Md. 67, 580 
A.2d 1077 (1990). We do not believe the cases 
cited support appellee's position. In Holston, this 
Court reversed the chancellor who had ordered 
rehabilitative alimony. The Holston Court ordered 
that the chancellor grant indefinite alimony. In 
Hull, the chancellor had denied alimony and we 
affirmed, saying, "At the time of trial, therefore, the 
Wife had anticipated assets of $1,100,000. As her 
counsel conceded during the trial, she was self 
supporting.... We find no fault with Judge Heise's 
decision that alimony was not required in this case." 
In the case at bar, the chancellor had before him a 
financial statement setting out appellant's monthly 
net income at $2,075 and monthly living expenses 
of $6,719. This was sufficient evidence to foreclose 
a holding on our part that the chancellor abused his 
discretion by awarding rehabilitative alimony to 
appellant. 
VI. 
[10] Appellee's last objection is well taken. He 
states that the parties acquired EE bonds during their 
marriage, some titled in joint names and some in 
appellee's name alone. The trial judge ordered that 
the bonds be equally divided between the parties. 
Appellee objects because the court cannot transfer 
ownership from one party to another. Blake v. 
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Blake, 81 Md.App. 712, 569 A.2d 724 (1990). 
Appellee states, and we agree, "the appropriate 
process would be to determine whether or not the 
property is marital and pursuant to Md.Code Ann., 
Fam.Law § 8-203, value the property. Then the 
court should consider the factors set forth in 
Md.Code Ann. Fam. Law § 8-205 as to whether or 
not a monetary award should be made to compensate 
one or the other party for any inequity resulting 
from a division of the EE bonds according to title." 
The question of the bonds should be considered 
along with the other items of marital property 
belonging to the parties. 
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND 
REVERSED IN PART. CASE REMANDED TO 
THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE 
COUNTY FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS 
CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. 
COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLEE. 
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